Introduction
Copyright, originally conceived as a tool to protect the author and to provide incentives for him to create for the benefit of society, is nowadays more and more perceived as a mechanism to the advantage of 'large, impersonal and unlovable corporations'. 2 As the results of a major recent study on the intellectual property (IP) perceptions of Europeans demonstrate, more than 40 per cent of EU citizens, when asked who benefits the most from IP protection, mention large companies and famous artists, 3 and not creators or the society at large.
The inherent social dimension of copyright law has hence progressively been lost of sight by policymakers to the benefit of strictly individualistic, even egotistic conceptions. In the recent discourse on the strengthening of legal means of protection, copyright is more frequently presented as an investment-protection mechanism 4 than a vehicle of cultural and social progress. In this context, the society's enrichment and future creativity are often portrayed in the rhetoric of the major economic players only as 'a fortunate by-product of private (Dalloz, 2004) 127, correctly emphasises, we have been witnessing for several years a change in the centre of interest of the law 'turning from the inventor's person to the investing company'. This change of paradigm can already be considered worrying since the perception of investment does not contain any human or ethical dimension. Compensation of the investment is not systematically a synonym for progress, and as Professor Remiche recalls, 'to accent the investment -or even to make the nearly single element out of it -means to incite the research and the investment only there where they are the most cost-effective and profitable!' (at 128). The interest of society cannot be reduced to economic interest; the social justification for intellectual property is larger and should take into account certain fundamental values. entitlement'. 5 A good example of this discourse can be found in the huge advertisement campaigns that were launched a few years ago by the music industry, showing young internet users behind bars for having engaged in music file sharing and using classical analogy with the theft of tangible goods, according to which illegal downloading amounts to going into a shop and stealing. 6 This has provoked some important counter-reactions: as copyright is perceived mainly as a right to forbid, to sanction and punish, infringing copyright has evolved, predominantly among the young generations, to an act of protest, 7 leading to a serious crisis of legitimacy. 8 Even among creators, copyright is increasingly perceived as a hurdle in the creative process, as the success of so-called 'open content' models clearly demonstrates.
These developments urgently attest the need to rethink copyright in order to adapt its rules to its initially dual character: 1) of a right to secure and organise cultural participation and access to creative works (access aspect); and 2) of a guarantee that the creator participates fairly in the fruit of the commercial exploitation of his works (protection aspect). Avoiding the privatisation of information by copyright law 9 and assuring that cultural goods are still available for future innovations 'European Citizens and Intellectual Property', above n 2, 55. 8
Further on this crisis, see e.g. N Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda from 9 February 2010 until 1 November 2014, 'Our Single Market is Crying Out for Copyright Reform', Speech delivered at the opening of Information Influx, the 25th anniversary International Conference of the Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam, 2 July 2014 (European Commission -SPEECH/14/528): 'Every day citizens … across the EU break the law just to do something commonplace. And who can blame them when those laws are so ill-adapted … Technology moves faster than the law can, particularly in the EU. Today, the EU copyright framework is fragmented, inflexible, and often irrelevant. It should be a stimulant to openness, innovation and creativity, not a tool for of obstruction, limitation and control. ' 9 Further on this tendency, see C Geiger, 'Flexibilising Copyright -Remedies to the Privatisation of Information by Copyright Law ' (2008) might mean (re)conceiving copyright as an 'access right', 10 and not as the right to forbid, exclude or sanction, thus emphasising the inclusive rather than the exclusive nature of copyright protection.
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Before turning to the consequences of such an understanding for the shape and use of copyright law (II), it will however be necessary to examine, first, the rationales underlying the often neglected nature of copyright as an 'access right' (I).
Rationales for copyright to be conceived as an access right
Aquinas expressed an opinion that 'positive right' (jus positivum) could be regarded as fair and legitimate only inasmuch as it aims at the common wellbeing: put differently, if the right fulfils its so-called 'social function'. This idea has been hereafter reiterated by many legal philosophers. 13 It was first confined to the context of private law in general (1) and then extended more specifically to the sphere of intellectual property (2).
The social function of law
Balance is the key concept that lies behind the social function. If law is a question of balance, there cannot be an 'absolute' right that can be exercised in a totally self-reflective manner with no consideration for the consequences that this exercise involves. As has been aptly put by Du Pasquier, 'the role of the law is to assure the peaceful coexistence of the human group or, as is often said, to harmonise the activity of members of society. In a word, it is the basis for the social order, which could only be achieved through a balance between opposing interests'. 14 In France, this idea was developed in the 1930s by Louis Josserand. So far as concerns the right to property, he wrote that 'there is no need to investigate deeply to notice that this right that claims to be unlimited involves, above all in the field of real estate, a multitude of obstacles, barriers, frontiers that restrain its movements and oppose its expansion.' He further adds: 'This is fortunate, since if this tyrannical in common law countries, both as an argument to extend and to limit protection. See G Davies, Copyright and the public interest, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2 nd ed, 2002) 236, 'It is seen to be in the public interest that authors and other right owners should be encouraged to publish their works so as to permit the widest possible dissemination of works to the public at large … Thus, while copyright protection is justified by the public interest, the States imposes certain limitations thereto, again in the public interest.' Thus, there is already an important legal background and understanding attached to this terminology, which does not favour the 'blue-sky thinking' encouraged by the editors of this volume when rethinking and redesigning copyright law. The terms 'public interest', when used in this chapter, will thus refer only to situations when this wording has been employed by legislators of courts (for example in quotes) or will be put in brackets. right was left to itself, to its specific nature, it would invade everything and end up by destroying itself'. 15 In the field of contract law, this social concept has been more recently developed by a number of legal scholars. Denis Mazeaud, for example, advocates 'the definitive recognition of a principle of 'loyalty, solidarity and fraternity' as a main and guiding principle of contemporary contract law '. 16 In Germany, the theory of the social function of private law (Sozialbindung des Privatrechts) 17 made its appearance at the end of the 19th century, subsequently becoming a fundamental principle of German private law. 18 This theory insists on the idea that private rights are limited by social constraints. It underlines the social nature of the legal system and the function of private law, which is to regulate the relationships between individuals within society. The function of the legal system is thus to find a compromise between the interests of the individual and the interests of the community. It must, on the one hand, ensure the grant of subjective rights to individuals but at the same time, on the other hand, ensure that these are compatible with the interests of the rest of the community. The rights of the individual are not seen as an absolute right but rather as rights limited in social terms. This theory is implemented, moreover, in the extremely rich judicial practice developed on the basis of Section 242 of the German Civil Code concerning good faith -a general clause that in the hands of the judge has become a veritable balancing instrument.
The social function of copyright law and the common interest
The idea that copyright must serve a social function has its origins in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. 20 It rests upon the idea that intellectual property law is the product of a type of 'social contract' between the author and society. 21 According to this concept, copyright is justified because it encourages creativity. Society has a need for intellectual productions in order to ensure its development and cultural, economic, technological and social progress and therefore grants the creator a reward in the form of an intellectual property right, which enables him to exploit his work and to draw benefits from it. In return, the creator, by rendering his creation accessible to the public, enriches the community. Copyright law is hence 'conditioned' by the achievement of certain objectives and its use can be (or rather must be) measured in the light of the results obtained. This particularly strong focus on the interests of society very soon led numerous German scholars to extend the theory of the social function to intellectual property rights.
22 Julius Kopsch as early as the 1920s even evoked the idea of an 'increased' social function with respect to intellectual property. 23 One key aspect that derives from the social function is thus that the objectives and conditions of the exercise of copyright should always be examined in the light of the interest of society and the common interest. However, what exactly is this common interest? Most of the time, this notion is closely related to utilitarian doctrines, but philosophically speaking, there are several different versions of Utilitarianism. as the common interest has to be reflected by law. In a second interpretation, the notion is understood in exactly the opposite way: the common interest is defined according to the particular interests of the individual (Bentham, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill); 27 from the sum of the individual interests, acting in their own advantage, emerges the common interest. The common interest is the one that maximises profits of the majority of individuals. The third understanding of the notion is Christian in its inspiration. The common interest is defined as the 'good of Mankind' (Thomas Aquinas, Hume); 28 in this conception, the reference is the human being. The role of society is to define a framework for human development and happiness, according to universal human values (including immaterial benefits such as social cohesion, solidarity, education, health, culture, sustainable development, etc.). This common interest has to originate from the 'Human' and be implemented by legislators. The link to human rights is here easily made and it is therefore not surprising to find human rights and constitutional law obligations among the second category of rationales for copyright as an 'access right'.
Copyright through the lens of international human rights law and domestic constitutional law
The common interest rationales behind IP protection are envisaged in numerous international and regional human rights treaties and national constitutions worldwide. This is done, first, through incorporation of certain 29 copyright aspects in the universally recognised right to culture and science 30 The best example of an access-safeguarding framework for copyright protection is offered by article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 33 According to its first paragraph, everyone has 'the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits', while according to the second paragraph of the same provision, everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 34 Although it is true that the UDHR does not have a direct binding effect, the same does not apply to article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 35 adopting the wording of the UDHR almost verbatim.
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On the regional level, copyright is in a similar manner conceived as enabling access to science and culture in article 14 of the Additional The classical foundations of IP are placed in a stable balance in these international human rights instruments: on the one hand, the foundation of natural law by acknowledging an exploitation right and a 'droit moral' for the creator; and, on the other hand, the utilitarian foundation, because this acknowledgement has the promotion of intellectual variety and the spread of culture and science throughout society as a goal. 40 Further, both the UDHR and the ICESCR emphasise the link to the 'author', namely the creator, also referring to the words such as 'he' and 'everyone', thereby excluding protection of the legal entities' entitlements on the level of human rights.
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So far as concerns the domestic constitutional level, an impressive number of national primary law instruments mirror the UDHR and the ICESCR in safeguarding creators' rights within the scope of the right to science and culture. 42 Most of such clauses are characterised The common interest considerations behind the grant of protection are made salient here: exclusive rights are conferred insofar and inasmuch as they facilitate cultural progress. The interests of society are a reason for granting protection but also a reason for limiting it -a premise that has been further interpreted and completed by the established judicial practice of the US Supreme Court. For instance, a decision dating from 1932 laid down that the 'sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring a monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labour of authors'. 46 In addition, the 'Progress-Clause' explicitly refers to 'authors' as beneficiaries of copyright protection, thereby reinforcing, on a constitutional level, the primary role of the creator.
Copyright as an exception to freedom of expression
In direct link with its capacity to enable cultural access is the constitutional perception of copyright as an integral part of the right to freedom of expression and information.
Since its inception copyright has maintained close links with freedom of expression and its corollary, the public's right to receive and impart information. 47 In fact, the access to information and copyright fully converge regarding both the rationale and the principles involved. This recognition of creators' rights as an exception to the general rule of freedom of expression protection dovetails with the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the body in charge of interpreting and enforcing the ECHR. 53 In particular, two 55 clearly demonstrated the major change of perspective on copyright as being traditionally regarded immune from any external freedom of expression review. In both cases the ECtHR held that the use of a copyrighted work could be considered as an exercise of the right to freedom of expression, even if the use qualifies as an infringement and is profit-motivated. Therefore, by verifying if in the given situation the interference can be justified with regard to other conflicting rights, the ECtHR advanced the idea that freedom of expression has to be considered as the point of departure and that no predetermined answer can be given by copyright law. 56 This goes in line with the freedom of expression-compliant principle that the exclusive right constitutes an exception to a broader principle of freedom of use. Protocol to the ECHR (guaranteeing the general protection of property) in fact extends, in the absence of a specific Convention clause on IP, to the protection of intellectual property rights. 58 The inclusion of intellectual property within the protection of property at the constitutional level is important because it expands the social function of property to intellectual property. In fact, the right to property protected by the Convention is inherently limited by its social function. 59 The first paragraph of article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR provides for the possibility of restrictions of the right 'in the public interest', while the second paragraph of the same provision allows the State 'to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest …'.
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Unlike the ECHR, yet another principal European human rights instrument, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), explicitly places intellectual property within its catalogue of fundamental rights. In particular, article 17, dealing with the general right to property under its first paragraph, also contains a second paragraph specifying in a somewhat laconic way: 'Intellectual property shall be protected'. 61 Even though not devoid of a considerable amount of controversy, this clause needs to be analysed through the prism of the provision within which it is incorporated. Thus, article 17(1) of the EU Charter on the general guarantee of property clearly safeguards the social limits of the right: it reiterates that '[t]he use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest '. 62 This limited nature of the right to property was clearly envisaged by the drafters of both the Charter and the ECHR. As the travaux préparatoires of the First Protocol to the ECHR demonstrate, a newly introduced property paradigm was viewed as being of a 'relative' nature as opposed to the absolute right to own property in a sense it was understood by Roman law. 63 A similar logic, clearly excluding an 'absolutist' conception of IP, accompanies the preparatory documents of the EU Charter, insofar as the drafters took care to specify that 'the guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 [of article 17] shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property' and that 'the meaning and scope of Article 17 are the same as those of the right guaranteed under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR'. 64 Article 17(2) of the Charter could then be considered to be nothing more than a simple clarification of article 17(1), with the consequence that there would be absolutely no justification to expand protection on this ground. It is this 'restrictive' understanding of IP protection that has clearly accompanied the recent case law of the CJEU. 65 According to the latter:
the protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court's case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected. 
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The right to property in the Charter and in the ECHR is thus considered as a right having strong social bounds and its scope of protection is therefore limited by nature, 68 leaving the states a large margin of appreciation to regulate property. 69 This means that copyright -just like the right to physical property -can be limited in order to safeguard the interests of society at large.
2. Consequences for the shape and use of copyright as an access right 2.1. The need to secure the balance of interests within copyright law: The social contract implies duties for authors and rights for users Admitting that intellectual property law has a social purpose and is grounded on human rights obligations should, in principle, lead the legislature to check that copyright rules actually reflect their access aspect and, if not, to correct them. As Professor Schricker aptly noted, if account is taken of the cultural, economic and social consequences of copyright, one might wonder whether the legislature (and the judges interpreting the provisions of copyright law) should not be expected to take account of the general interest in the positive sense: copyright should be conceived of in such a way that it contributes as much as possible to the development of intellectual, cultural and economic progress. 70 This would require a legislator to first justify convincingly the grant of intellectual property rights (which seems difficult where the rule is the pure result of pressure from certain interest groups), and then to exercise subsequently a sort of 'self-monitoring'. In this sense, the social function with its integral access aspect could imply a duty to demonstrate why legislation is passed and what results are to be obtained, by means of reliable data and impact studies that will make it possible to measure the probable consequences of the legislative activity. 71 This would have a very important consequence, since the legislator would have an obligation to justify any extension of intellectual property law. Moreover, this could imply that the legislator periodically evaluates the results of past copyright legislations and verifies that they have led to the desired results, with the logical consequence of having to modify them when this is found not to be the case. 72 A good example is the steady increase over time of the term of protection of copyright and neighbouring rights, which has regularly caused heated debates among scholars and copyright experts, 70 G Schricker, 'Introduction' in G Schricker (ed), Urheberrecht Kommentar (Beck, 2 nd ed, 1999) 7. 71 See in this sense, in the context of the EU, C Geiger, 'The Construction of Intellectual Property in the European Union: Searching for Coherence' in C Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property: Achievements and New Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2013) EIPIN Series, vol 1, 5, advocating that future initiatives by the European legislature need to be based more frequently on serious (and above all independent) economic data and on impact studies that will make it possible to measure the probable consequences of the legislative activity. See also the report of Professor I Hargreaves, 'Digital Opportunity, A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth', May 2011, 1, inviting the legislature 'to ensure that in the future, policy on Intellectual Property issues is constructed on the basis of evidence, rather than weight of lobbying'. More generally on the importance of evidence-based policies in copyright law, see recently J Poort, Empirical Evidence for Policy in Telecommunication, Copyright and Broadcasting (Amsterdam University Press, 2015) 9: 'Increasingly, politicians, judges and stake holders require economic analysis and economic evidence to make informed decisions about new policy measures, to make optimal decisions within the legal boundaries and to fathom the proposed consequences of proposed legal interventions. Without empirical evidence they may simply assume the effects of a policy measure as an article of faith' (emphasis added). 72 At present in the EU, it is true that the Commission sometimes undertakes evaluations of past directive. However, an unsatisfying result of past legislation hardly leads to any action. A good example has been the negative evaluation of the legal protection for databases, implemented in the EU through a very complicated legal instrument, which according to the Commission's own admission did not had the expected success ( criticising this extension as being detrimental to the public domain and leading rather to rent-seeking than to an increase of creation of new works. 73 The question then arises: how to oblige the legislature to respect copyright as an access right? This could be the case if an access aspect of intellectual property is established at a supra-legislative level. The problem is that in the European Union and some of its member states, unlike in the United States, there is no constitutional clause regulating the activity of the legislature when it comes to passing intellectual property legislation. However, as emphasised above, intellectual property has been raised to the supra-legislative level by attaching it to the constitutional protection of the right to property, which may be subjected to restrictions that are justified by the general interest. In this spirit, the German Constitutional Court has laid down very clearly in the context of copyright that while the protection of property rights:
implies that the economic benefits of the work are in principle owed to the author, the constitutional protection of property rights does not extend to all these benefits. It is for the legislature to set out the contours of copyright by imposing appropriate criteria that take account of the nature and social function of copyright and to ensure that the author participates in the exploitation of the work fairly. The legislature is thus subjected to an obligation of moderation. This obligation of balance is accentuated by the fact that the legislature is required, when laying down the contours of the right, to respect other fundamental rights of equal value; 75 it is for this reason, moreover, that all legislation on intellectual property rights imposes a certain number of limitations and exceptions on the exclusive right. To a large extent, attaching intellectual property rights to fundamental rights thus guarantees respect for the social function of these rights. 76 In practical terms, it can even be asked if the obligation to protect competing fundamental rights and values when implementing new intellectual property legislation should not oblige the legislator also to implement legal duties for right holders. 77 Philosophically speaking, this would clearly be in line with the idea of the social contract underlying the social function, which implies counterparts. As one scholar has interestingly stated, 'the grant of a right in the intellectual property may itself be derivative of a duty to others; that is, when the intellectual property owner acquires a legal intellectual property right, a duty to the public is simultaneously imposed on the intellectual property owner'.
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Such obligations imposed on right holders could for example result in a duty to disseminate as widely as possible protected creations and to exploit them. This could result in a prohibition to prevent the dissemination of any protected creation: for example, by securing access to orphan, out of print works, forbidding the use of contracts or TPMs (technological protection measures) that are blocking access through exceptions and limitations, and other analogous obligations. The right holders' duties would also envisage allowance of a public discourse about a certain creation through parody, quotations, creative reuse and alike. As can be seen, some of these duties clearly result from fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of information, artistic freedom or freedom to conduct a business, and the positive obligation of the State to protect those rights could imply that mechanisms are inserted in intellectual property law to secure these values.
One such mechanism would be to grant users' rights which could be enforced in courts. 80 Limitations to intellectual property rights, which are based on fundamental rights and thereby represent basic democratic values within IP law, could be elevated to rights of the users (and not mere interests to be taken into account), which are of equal value as the exclusive right. 81 The consequence of this is that they should be considered mandatory (which means the user's exercise of statutory limitations cannot be restricted by contract) 82 and should prevail over technical measures. The national legislatures could introduce into their acts a prohibition of technical devices that (2010) Intellectual Property Quarterly, 1. One of the duties of right holders could be to guarantee that access is granted under fair conditions (pricing issue) and that the business models are adapted to the needs of consumers (easy to use, diversity of content, usable on a variety of devices etc.). In fact, granting access under unfair conditions or at too high a price results often in hindering access for a majority of people. Libraries and archives have a particular role to play here, and there could be a duty to make the work available also through these channels. a use privileged by law, or at least grant the user judicial means to 'enforce' his exceptions (this would lead to the creation of a 'subjective right' to the exception). In the European context, such action could even be deduced from the InfoSoc Directive.
83 According to article 6(4) of the Directive, member states shall take 'appropriate measures' to ensure the functioning of certain limitations when technical measures are implemented. However, the Directive does not specify what these measures could consist of. Arguably, it would be contrary to the states' obligations under article 15 ICESCR, article 10 ECHR and to the social function of copyright if it is not assured that the beneficiaries of exceptions listed in article 6(4) are able to benefit from them.
Importantly, the idea of users' rights as enforceable rights of equal value appears to have found its way into the recent practice of the CJEU. 84 In particular, in its decision in UPC Telekabel from March 2014, the Court clearly adopted the language of users' rights as a counterbalance to the disproportionally extensive enforcement of copyright. 85 The Court, by obliging the national authorities (albeit under the limited range of circumstances) to avail the users of the procedural opportunity to challenge copyright enforcement measures before the courts, 86 accepts the idea that fundamental right (in the instant case -freedom of expression) may be invoked as not a mere defence but as a right on which an action in the main case is based. Since UPC Telekabel, the idea of users' rights has already reoccurred in Ulmer from September 2014. Notably, the CJEU referred in that case to the 'ancillary right' of users to digitise works contained in publicly accessible libraries' collections. 87 In the Court's opinion, such a right of communication of works enjoyed by establishments such as publicly accessible libraries would stem from the exception in article 5(3)(n) InfoSoc for the purpose of research and private study. In the light of this recent case law of the CJEU, it can be argued that the Court moves towards understanding human rights as an integral part of the European copyright order in full recognition of the above-examined social function of IP law and its underlying human rights rationales.
On the other side of the Atlantic, an analogously liberal stance has been taken by the Supreme Court of Canada, which, since its groundbreaking Théberge 88 and CCH 89 decisions, was increasingly emphasising 'a move away from an earlier, author-centric view' towards 'promoting the public interest' and the 'users' rights [as] an essential part of furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act'. 90 Interestingly, the Court explicitly referred in these cases to the 'proper balance between protection and access' as an ultimate goal of any copyright law regulation. As we have seen, the same dual rationale underlines the protection of creators under article 27 UDHR and article 15 ICESCR -provisions intrinsically integrating the access and protection aspects of copyright. In short, it can be stated that the legislator should secure that the human rights implementation within the intellectual property regimes is safeguarded from private ordering. This implies for example that at least the exceptions and limitations that are justified by human rights rationales are declared mandatory 91 and that mechanisms are implemented to secure their effectiveness, especially in the digital environment (where they are endangered by technical protection measures and online contracts). If one considers intellectual property rights as exceptions to a major principle of the freedom of use, 93 then this implies also some changes in positive law. Very simply, this could imply that the exclusive rights would have to be conceived restrictively and the limitations broadly, at least in a flexible manner. This could for example be achieved by changing the perspective and introducing a sort of three-step test to determine access to protection.
Towards a three-step test to gain access to copyright protection?
The idea of having a 'test' to qualify for protection is commonly accepted in countries such as the UK, where the judges for a long time used to appeal to the 'skill-and-labour-test' to decide whether a creation can be protected or not. 94 91 Not all the exceptions and limitations have the same justification and importance with regard to securing access. The limitations that necessitate particular attention include exceptions for libraries and archives, for teaching and research purposes, for news reports, for press reviews, for quotations and parodies and, more incidentally, exception for people with disabilities, as well as private copying when it allows access to information and is not covered by one of the exceptions already mentioned. Therefore, it would be interesting to elaborate a certain number of criteria that an expression would need to satisfy in order to enjoy protection. For this, the American conception of fair use or the threestep test, which sets criteria for exempted use, could serve as a model, except that such a test would not circumscribe the limitations but provide for the conditions of access to protection. Now, what would be these criteria? First, in order to have a uniform approach (between continental and common law), the criterion of creativity is to be preferred to 'originality', usually defined as the 'print of the author's personality'. The second is too difficult to determine and involves the risk of arbitrariness. Moreover, referring to the function of law as an instrument to promote creativity, property should only be granted if there is any creative contribution or collective enrichment. Thus, henceforth, it should be the degree of creativity that separates protected from unprotected forms.
In this context, Professor Mireille Buydens of the University of Brussels has suggested a very interesting distinction between creation protected by copyright law and 'quasi-creation', which would benefit from a different type of protection. According to her, the freedom of which the creator disposes constitutes the distinctive criterion.
The distinctive criterion concerning creation and quasi-creation is whether the freedom of the creator has been accessory or principal. If necessities concerning function, type, current style and methods of production are predominant, the work will be excluded from copyright protection. Concerning the protection of all the creations that are consequently excluded, Mireille Buydens suggests creating a specific system of quasi-creation that is meant to complement existing legal instruments (design law in particular). Evidently, there is a need to envisage new solutions or to improve existing instruments. This is not the place to specify details, but it shows that it is possible to find more objective criteria for deciding whether a form is protected or not by copyright. Furthermore, the judge could also take into consideration the consequences that copyright protection might have on creations in the future as well as the impact of the right on the availability of information and the common interest. This would mean that courts should also take into account some fundamental-rights rationales when deciding whether the work enjoys protection or not.
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In fact, public interest objectives such as competition law and certain fundamental rights, generally a justification for exempting a certain use, could already be taken into consideration at the protection level. Hence, certain forms could be excluded from protection because of their importance to society, following the example of article 2(4) of the Berne Convention of 1886. 98 This would result in giving the public domain a positive definition. 99 Let us take, for example, the case of a photograph capturing the assassination of a famous person, or a letter from an important politician who has been involved in a corruption scandal. It would be possible to take into account the freedom of expression and the public's right to information (article 10 97 See in this sense Geiger, above n 39. 98 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 September 1886 (amended in 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971, and 1979) 25 UST 1341, 828 UNTS 221, entered into force 5 December 1887 ('Berne Convention'), article 2(4): 'It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the protection to be granted to official texts of a legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official translation of such texts'. 102 Even if the court did not refer to article 10 ECHR, it seems that the court implicitly balanced the interest of the right holders with those of the public to be informed about the conversation already at the protection level and let the freedom of information prevail. In a similar vein, when the French courts exclude in a very radical way perfume from copyright protection, this is certainly likewise part of an effort to restrain the field of protection. 102 Note, however, that this ruling was subsequently referred back to appeal by the Dutch Supreme Court, concluding that copyright protection without an intention to create was not impossible by definition. The Supreme Court stated that though it is true that there must be human labour and therefore creative choices, it is however not important whether the author has intentionally wanted to create a work and has intentionally wanted to make particular original choices of the utility of a work, would lose all its interest. In fact, either the creator has enjoyed sufficient freedom during the creation process and will thus enjoy copyright protection, or the creative factor has only been accessory because of numerous necessities, in which case he will have access to another system of protection (e.g. design law). Consequently, one would need to distinguish whether a utility work is predominantly creative or functional. It is true that there is a certain risk that certain peripheral creations might be 'declassed' to functional objects. This, however, is the price to pay in order to 'purify' copyright law from certain forms and to guarantee a certain availability of information (which represents nothing more than ideas 'put into form'). It must also be specified that this does not mean that these works will go unprotected. They will merely not be protected by such a strong and enduring protection as copyright, but by other existing protection mechanisms (or mechanisms that would have to be created). 
An extensive/flexible understanding of copyright limitations
As demonstrated above, in view of the approach that free use (freedom of expression, freedom of science and arts) represents the principle, and exclusive rights the exception, limitations to exclusivity cannot be considered as 'exceptions' to the principle of exclusivity. At the end, the demand for a more extensive and rigorous protection, 107 as well as the postulate of a narrow interpretation of copyright limitations, represents a purely political statement. In this context, what would matter is only whether copyright regulation achieves the desired purpose, not what legal technique (exclusive right or limitation) is used. In fact, 'exceptions' 108 are no more than simple tools for the legislators to delimit the scope of the right, in order to maintain the balance of right holders' and users' rights. 109 Hence, they should be interpreted in accordance with their underlying justification. Starting out from the assumption that copyright serves the interest of society by encouraging creation of new works, it is necessary to permit sufficient free space for creativity.
Furthermore, even in economic terms, the value of limitations can be measured in various forms, typically showing the benefits of such a system. 110 There are, in fact, numerous businesses that use 'free' material -meaning material where uses are permitted by a limitation (so-called 'added value services') -to generate income and economic growth. 111 Even if the limitation provides for the payment of remuneration, the absence of costs related to finding the right holder and the negotiation of a license (not to mention, in case of problems, the costs related to litigation), also has a measurable value, and therefore facilitates the creative reuses of existing works. 112 In some cases, changes in technical or social circumstances might yet require extensive interpretation and even the creation of new exceptions by analogy (i.e. without legal basis). 113 way. 118 According to article 5(5) of the Directive, 'exceptions and limitations … shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subjectmatter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder'. 119 The judge -being the person who generally applies the exception -will henceforth be able to use this legal instrument in order to adapt exceptions to circumstances that have not been provided for by copyright law. 120 In fact, this flexibility need not lead to a reduction of the exceptions. With a certain free hand granted generally to the judge, this freedom of action should logically not only be used to restrict but also to extend. 121 It is true that this fact might be slightly detrimental to legal certainty. Yet this is the price to be paid in order to achieve a refined application of exceptions (in both senses) and, thus, an adaptation of the system to new circumstances. Otherwise, the entire test should be rejected, for the lack of legal certainty cannot, on the one hand, be acceptable when it benefits the right owner and, on the other hand, be considered unacceptable if it is of advantage to the user.
In fact, the third step of the test deals with the justification that underlies the limitation. Therefore, it is by far the most important part of the test. According to it, application of limits to copyright must not be to any 'unjustified' disadvantage of the copyright owner. The rationale is that the author should not be in the position to control all sorts of use of his work, but he has to tolerate certain interferences as long as they are justified by values that are superior to the copyright owner's interests. 122 This formula will enable the judge to apply a sort of control of proportionality such as is used in cases of conflict between different fundamental rights. 123 In such cases, the judge takes into consideration the justification underlying the limitation concerned in order to achieve a refined balance of the different interests and fundamental rights involved. Thus combining the security of the closed system of exceptions with the flexibility of the fair-use method, this approach would have an interesting outcome: henceforth, the judge would be able to adjust the application of limitations not only with regard to the economic interests of the right holder but also by taking into consideration divergent interests of the users, as well as the interests of the author in case they are different from those of the exploiter. 124 in the future judges will be free to interpret the test in another way. In this way, they could draw inspiration from the suggestions of some scholars who have proposed other interpretations 126 in order to render the three-step test an efficient instrument of flexibility, so that limitations provided by the legal statutes could finally be interpreted more extensively.
Securing the material interests of creators:
A crucial aspect of copyright as an access right Establishing copyright as an access right and a right to participate in the cultural life does not necessarily mean that this access will be for free. In fact, one essential feature of a copyright system conceived as an access right is that in the spirit of the international human rights provisions that secure access to culture, the material and moral interests of the creators are safeguarded. This certainly implies that the copyright system benefits the creators in a better way, meaning that they must participate more effectively in the exploitation of their works. How this can finally be reached is secondary. One could, of course, imagine a better contract law 127 (with some mandatory rules, like the copyright contract rules of some European countries), but also an increase of statutory licences if these offer financially more favourable solutions for the creators than the exclusive right. 128 This latter course has so far remained relatively unexplored and still requires closer investigation. 129 In fact, from an international human rights perspective, neither the UDHR nor the ICESCR determine the way in which the protection of the relevant material and immaterial interests has to be achieved. There is no mention of the exclusive rights or even of property: that means that within the scope of these treaties, other means of protection are equally conceivable. 130 This leaves countries a good deal of room to manoeuvre, while at the same time guaranteeing creators a just remuneration for their work, which makes these legal instruments particularly modern and flexible means of regulating intellectual property matters.
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In summary, the copyright regimes should secure that creators participate fairly in the earnings generated by the commercial exploitation of their creations. This does not have to be necessarily through the implementation of an exclusive property right. Legislators should have the freedom to choose the legal means to secure the right for creators to receive a fair remuneration for the commercial exploitation of their works. 132 
Conclusion
An investigation of the basis of intellectual property shows that the classical justifications have been displaced in favour of protection of investment and that the balance within the system is threatening to break in favour of the exploiters of IP rights. This conclusion is not new, this 'paradigm shift' already having been stressed by the literature in the 1980s, 133 but no real conclusions were drawn at the time. Assuming, however, that the foundations of the system have changed, the same solutions cannot apply and establishing copyright as a 'right to access' rather than a 'right to forbid or sanction' has become absolutely necessary.
Of course, as we have seen, both the protection and access aspects of copyright are closely linked. However, the current overprotective tendencies might require an emphasis on cultural participation and on the inclusive function of copyright law in order to re-establish the fair balance of interests within the system. It is thus not without importance whether copyright is understood as a cultural right or as an investment-protection mechanism, and the massive rejection of intellectual property in the public opinion is a clear indicator of this. As we have shown, (re)conceiving IP, and in particular copyright, as an access right 134 will help avoiding the privatisation of information by IP law 135 and assure that cultural and scientific creations are still available for future innovations. 
